Opportunism, knowledge, and the performance of franchise chains

An important feature of most franchise chains is that they simultaneously use franchised and company-owned outlets. In this study, I show that the relationship between the resources provided to outlet managers and the financial performance of franchise chains is contingent on their governance structure. Specifically, opportunism and knowledge considerations seem to prevent chains with a large proportion of franchised outlets from fully leveraging resources such as a valuable brand name and tacit business practices. On the other hand, brand name value and business practices tacitness are not directly related to the proportion of franchised outlets in chains. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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