The evolving role of the DSO in efficiently accommodating distributed generation

This report investigates the evolving role of the distribution system operator (DSO) regarding the efficient access to and integration distribution networks of distributed generation. It investigates the business environment for DSOs shaped importantly by the regulatory framework to which the DSO is subjected. The focus is on cost impacts for DSOs of their provision of access to increasing volumes of distributed generation (DG) to their networks by DSOs and the contractual relationships between the DSO and DG operators. Moreover, the report describes opportunities for DSOs and DG operators to become involved in the delivery of ancillary power system services. The report concludes with recommendations on new broad directions for net-work regulation that will better align the profitability of the DSO business to their provision of socio-economically efficient network services and to a paradigm shift from passive towards ac-tive network management practices.

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