Random Delays to Limit Timing Covert Channel

Covert channels are used for information transmission in a manner that is not intended for communication and is difficult to detect. The authors have proposed and investigated the way to counter the leakage of information via IP timing covert channels by introducing additional random delays before packets' sending. The main topic of the research is the case when the capacity of the covert channel does not exceed the permissible value. In addition, practical recommendations to choose the counteraction parameter values are given.

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