Modelling routing in wireless ad hoc networks with dynamic Bayesian games

Mobile agents acting in wireless ad hoc networks are energy constrained, which leads to potential selfishness as nodes are not necessarily willing to forward packets for other nodes. Situations like this are traditionally analyzed using game theory and recently also the ad hoc networking community has witnessed game-theoretic approaches to especially routing. However, from a theoretical point-of-view the contemporary game-theoretic approaches have mainly ignored two important aspects: non-simultaneous decision making and incorporating history information into the decision making process. In this article we propose a new model that fills these gaps and allows to analyze routing theoretically.

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