Synchronizing Global Supply Chains: Advance Purchase Discounts

We study the economics of sharing demand information between a dual sourcing firm and its network of retailers. Our analysis demonstrates that employing Advance Purchase Discount (APD) contracts in these supply chains removes significant impediments to information sharing. Essentially, these contracts synchronize the timeline of the dual sourcing firm's decisions with the actions of its network of retailers. This enables accurate, timely, and self-enforcing information sharing, which reduces the demand - supply mismatches, and improves the profitability of each of the agents in the supply chain. We provide prescriptions on the appropriate design of contracts that enable this Pareto-improving information sharing. Next, we extend this analysis to incorporate realistic constraints on the dual sourcing firm's limited knowledge of its retailers' operational costs and information quality. We characterize “certainty-equivalent” values of the unknown retailer parameters, which facilitate analogous prescriptions for the design of APD contracts in these realistic settings. It is interesting that the unobservability of retailer parameters leads to an asymmetric and “degree-of-unobservability dependent” departure from the full-observability design of the APD contract. If the uncertainty in the unobserved parameter is small, then the optimal discount is higher compared to the case of full observability; conversely, when the uncertainty is large, the optimal discount is lower. It is significant that, despite the departure in the design of the APD contract, this analysis reiterates that the benefits of APDs persist even under this practical constraint. Finally, we report on the application of our prescription to a U.S.-based apparel wholesaler. Using data derived from the operations of this firm, we estimate that APD-enabled improved information sharing can increase net profits by about 17%.

[1]  Hau L. Lee,et al.  Global Logistics Indicators, Supply Chain Metrics, and Bilateral Trade Patterns , 2005 .

[2]  Yossi Aviv,et al.  The Effect of Collaborative Forecasting on Supply Chain Performance , 2001, Manag. Sci..

[3]  Georgia Perakis,et al.  Regret in the Newsvendor Model with Partial Information , 2008, Oper. Res..

[5]  Fuqiang Zhang,et al.  Advance Demand Information, Price Discrimination, and Pre-Order Strategies , 2012 .

[6]  Wenjie Tang,et al.  Ultimatum Deadlines , 2009, Manag. Sci..

[7]  Terry A. Taylor,et al.  Sale Timing in a Supply Chain: When to Sell to the Retailer , 2006, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[8]  Krishnan S. Anand,et al.  The Strategic Perils of Delayed Differentiation , 2007, Manag. Sci..

[9]  Albert Y. Ha,et al.  Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition , 2008, Manag. Sci..

[10]  Steven M. Shugan,et al.  Electronic Tickets, Smart Cards, and Online Prepayments: When and How to Advance Sell , 2001 .

[11]  Dilip Roy,et al.  SOME RESULTS ON REVERSED HAZARD RATE , 2001, Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences.

[12]  Kumar Rajaram,et al.  Advance Booking Discount Programs Under Retail Competition , 2004, Manag. Sci..

[13]  Albert Y. Ha,et al.  Sharing Imperfect Demand Information in Competing Supply Chains with Production Diseconomies , 2008 .

[14]  Panagiotis Kouvelis,et al.  On the Complementary Value of Accurate Demand Information and Production and Supplier Flexibility , 2002, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[15]  Xuanming Su,et al.  Consumer Returns Policies and Supply Chain Performance , 2008, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[16]  Harshinder Singh,et al.  The Reversed Hazard Rate Function , 1998, Probability in the Engineering and Informational Sciences.

[17]  Lode Li Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition , 2002, Manag. Sci..

[18]  Yossi Aviv,et al.  Gaining Benefits from Joint Forecasting and Replenishment Processes: The Case of Auto-Correlated Demand , 2001, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[19]  J. Hammond,et al.  Sport Obermeyer Ltd. , 1994 .

[20]  Terry A. Taylor,et al.  Incentives for Retailer Forecasting: Rebates vs. Returns , 2009, Manag. Sci..

[21]  Anil Arya,et al.  Using Return Polices to Elicit Retailer Information , 2004 .

[22]  Barry Alan Pasternack,et al.  Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities , 2008, Mark. Sci..

[23]  Z. K. Weng,et al.  Designing a Firm's Coordinated Manufacturing and Supply Decisions with Short Product Life Cycles , 1997 .

[24]  Advance Booking Programs for Managing Supply, Demand, and Price Risks , 2010 .

[25]  Christopher S. Tang,et al.  The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain , 2000 .

[26]  Gérard P. Cachon The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance - Purchase Discount Contracts , 2004, Manag. Sci..

[27]  Krishnan S. Anand,et al.  Information and organization for horizontal multimarket coordination , 1997 .

[28]  Marshall L. Fisher,et al.  Reducing the Cost of Demand Uncertainty Through Accurate Response to Early Sales , 1996, Oper. Res..

[29]  P CachonGérard The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain , 2004 .

[30]  Terry A. Taylor,et al.  Channel Coordination Under Price Protection, Midlife Returns, and End-of-Life Returns in Dynamic Markets , 2001, Manag. Sci..

[31]  K. Donohue Efficient Supply Contracts for Fashion Goods with Forecast Updating and Two Production Modes , 2000 .

[32]  Sang‐Hyun Kim Supply Chain Collaboration Under Information Asymmetry , 2009 .

[33]  Christopher S. Tang,et al.  Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry , 2004, Manag. Sci..

[34]  Panagiotis Kouvelis,et al.  Order Quantity and Timing Flexibility in Supply Chains: The Role of Demand Characteristics , 2005, Manag. Sci..

[35]  Marshall L. Fisher,et al.  Supply Chain Inventory Management and the Value of Shared Information , 2000 .

[36]  Nils Rudi,et al.  Forward vs. spot buying of information goods on Web: analyzing the consumer decision process , 2001, Proceedings of the 34th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.

[37]  Özalp Özer,et al.  Strategic Commitments for an Optimal Capacity Decision Under Asymmetric Forecast Information , 2006, Manag. Sci..

[38]  Terry A. Taylor,et al.  Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer? , 2010, Manag. Sci..

[39]  Kumar Rajaram,et al.  Optimizing Inventory Replenishment of Retail Fashion Products , 2001, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[40]  Julia Miyaoka,et al.  How Improved Forecasts Can Degrade Decentralized Supply Chains , 2008, Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manag..

[41]  R. L. Winkler Combining Probability Distributions from Dependent Information Sources , 1981 .

[42]  Li Chen,et al.  Information Sharing and Order Variability Control Under a Generalized Demand Model , 2009, Manag. Sci..

[43]  Hongtao Zhang,et al.  Confidentiality and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Coordination , 2005 .

[44]  Gérard P. Cachon,et al.  Contracting to Assure Supply: How to Share Demand Forecasts in a Supply Chain , 2001, Manag. Sci..

[45]  Kumar Rajaram,et al.  The Benefits of Advance Booking Discount Programs: Model and Analysis , 2004, Manag. Sci..

[46]  J. J. D. Dana,et al.  Advance-Purchase Discounts and Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets , 1998 .

[47]  Manu Goyal,et al.  Strategic Information Management Under Leakage in a Supply Chain , 2009, Manag. Sci..

[48]  Özalp Özer,et al.  Selling to the "Newsvendor" with a forecast update: Analysis of a dual purchase contract , 2007, Eur. J. Oper. Res..