Cost Effective Regional Ballistic Missile Defense

Abstract : Within the strategic context of increasing capable threats and declining defense budgets, regional ballistic missile defense (BMD) plays a key role in protecting and advancing our national interests.1 However, this defensive capability is limited and has not kept pace with the increasingly rapid proliferation of regional ballistic missiles. This directly challenges the nations ability to deter and defeat aggression through power projection of our military forces. We must identify the ways and means to counter this imbalance or risk future erosion of our military effectiveness, diminished allied confidence, and unnecessarily shameful loss of life. The 2015 National Military Strategy emphasizes actions designed to improve the U.S. military's agility, innovation, and integration through greater efficiencies and delivery of advanced military capabilities. Yet, neither the current ballistic missile defense strategy nor current processes align with the innovative slant of the Departments latest overarching strategy. In a fiscally constrained environment, both require innovative thought and coordinated effort to efficiently resource future success. Current U.S. strategy to develop and field regional ballistic missile defenses, while a credible deterrent, is deficient and requires meaningful revision. The current strategic plan is woefully dated and corporate processes are not adequately synchronized to provide efficient, timely solutions. Due to a myriad of reasons including fiscal realities and threat capabilities, the Department of Defense (DoD) must re-assess key tenets of its Ballistic Missile Defense strategy and strive to innovate its processes in order to cost effectively match ends, ways, and means to defend against future regional ballistic missile threats.

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