THE SECRETARY PROBLEM IN A COMPETITIVE SITUATION
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This paper is concerned with two-person non-zero-sum game versions of the secretary problem. A remarkable feature of our models compared with previous ones is that Nash equilibrium strategies are different for two players, i.e. one player should behave more hastily, and the other less hastily, than in the secretary problem.
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