Harvesting dynamics in protected and unprotected areas

We propose a dynamic model for studying the time evolution of fish stocks in an environment divided into two adjacent zones with different fishing policies. We analyze two particular harvesting methods: constant fishing effort and profit maximization. In this case, some agents engage in competition based on maximization of individual profit whereas others cooperate. The asymptotic behavior of the system pinpoints that, even if the presence of a reserve area leads to higher levels of sustainability in exploiting fish stocks, attention should be paid in properly regulating the harvesting activity in order to avoid severe depletion of the resource.

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