A practical strongly secure one-round authenticated key exchange protocol without random oracles

Most recently, a variant of extended Canetti-Krawczyk model called as eCKw is introduced to provide stronger security than previous eCK models. Namely eCKw models formulate a stronger notion regarding weak perfect forward secrecy than other eCK models. In particular, any eCKw secure protocols can be generally transformed to achieve full provide perfect forward secrecy without requiring additional round. So far, there is no protocol which has been proven secure in the eCKw model without random oracles. In this paper, we study the open problem on constructing eCKw secure AKE protocol in the standard model. A new one-round AKE protocol is introduced relying on standard cryptographic primitives and a variant of bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. The main advantage of our proposal is its high efficiency in key exchange in contrast to the previous eCK secure protocols without random oracles and under post-specified peer setting. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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