Fear of Floating and De Facto Exchange Rate Pegs with Multiple Key Currencies

This paper adopts and develops the "fear of floating" theory to explain the decision to implement a de facto peg, the choice of anchor currency among multiple key currencies, and the role of central bank independence for these choices. We argue that since exchange rate depreciations are passed-through into higher prices of imported goods, avoiding the import of inflation provides an important motive to de facto peg the exchange rate in import-dependent countries. This study shows that the choice of anchor currency is determined by the degree of dependence of the potentially pegging country on imports from the key currency country and on imports from the key currency area, consisting of all countries which have already pegged to this key currency. The fear of floating approach also predicts that countries with more independent central banks are more likely to de facto peg their exchange rate since independent central banks are more averse to inflation than governments and can de facto peg a country's exchange rate independently of the government.

[1]  J. Frieden,et al.  Politics and Exchange Rates: A Cross-Country Approach to Latin America , 2000 .

[2]  N. Valev,et al.  The political economy of exchange rate regimes in transition economies , 2010 .

[3]  Inci Otker-Robe,et al.  The Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes Since 1990 Evidence from De Facto Policies , 2002, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[4]  M. Pagano,et al.  The advantage of tying one's hands: EMS discipline and Central Bank credibility , 1988 .

[5]  Jay C. Shambaugh The Effect of Fixed Exchange Rates on Monetary Policy , 2004 .

[6]  William T. Bernhard,et al.  Democratic Institutions and Exchange-rate Commitments , 1999, International Organization.

[7]  Barry Eichengreen,et al.  The Geography of the Gold Standard , 1994 .

[8]  E. Neumayer,et al.  Exchange Rate Regime Choice with Multiple Key Currencies , 2008 .

[9]  William T. Bernhard,et al.  A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence , 1998, American Political Science Review.

[10]  W. Clark,et al.  Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy , 2000, American Political Science Review.

[11]  A. Cukierman,et al.  Political Influence on the Central Bank- International Evidence , 1995 .

[12]  J. Frieden Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration , 2002, International Organization.

[13]  Guttorm Schjelderup,et al.  To Peg or Not to Peg? A Simple Model of Exchange Rate Regime Choice in Small Economies , 2001, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[14]  J. Marcus Fleming,et al.  Domestic Financial Policies Under Fixed and Under Floating Exchange Rates , 1962 .

[15]  A. Dreher,et al.  Does High Inflation Cause Central Bankers to Lose Their Job? Evidence Based on a New Data Set , 2007, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[16]  W. Clark,et al.  International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies , 1998, International Organization.

[17]  J. Broz,et al.  Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes , 2002, International Organization.

[18]  J. Broz,et al.  The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions , 2002, International Organization.

[19]  Ernesto H. Stein,et al.  Motorization and the Provision of Roads in Countries and Cities , 1997 .

[20]  T. Willett,et al.  The Interactions of Strength of Governments and Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes in Avoiding Currency Crises , 2009 .

[21]  A. Alesina,et al.  Choosing (and Reneging on) Exchange Rate Regimes , 2003 .

[22]  Why Do Countries Peg the Way They Peg? The Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice , 2008 .

[23]  Vera E. Troeger,et al.  Fear of Floating and the External Effects of Currency Unions , 2006 .

[24]  Alan M. Taylor,et al.  The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs Among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility , 2004, Review of Economics and Statistics.

[25]  Jens Hainmueller,et al.  Can Domestic Institutions Explain Exchange Rate Regime Choice? The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions Reconsidered , 2005 .

[26]  Barry Eichengreen,et al.  Exchange Rate Volatility and Intervention: Implications of the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas , 1998 .

[27]  C. Bodea Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks: A Correlated Choice of Imperfectly Credible Institutions , 2009, International Organization.

[28]  J. Frieden Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance , 1991, International Organization.

[29]  Davida Singer,et al.  Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility , 2009, International Organization.

[30]  J. Campa,et al.  Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Import Prices , 2004, Review of Economics and Statistics.

[31]  Mark Hallerberg Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions , 2002, International Organization.

[32]  R. Mundell A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas , 1961 .

[33]  K. Blackburn,et al.  Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence , 1989 .

[34]  Nathaniel Beck,et al.  Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable , 1998 .

[35]  W. Clark Partisan and Electoral Motivations and the Choice of Monetary Institutions Under Fully Mobile Capital , 2002, International Organization.

[36]  F. Sturzenegger,et al.  Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes: Deeds vs. Words , 2005 .

[37]  Carmen M. Reinhart,et al.  Fear of Floating , 2000, NursingLife.

[38]  P. Lane,et al.  Exchange Rates and Monetary Policy in Emerging Market Economies , 2001 .

[39]  D. Stasavage,et al.  Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments , 1999, International Organization.

[40]  Philip Keefer,et al.  The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy , 2003, American Political Science Review.

[41]  D. Kynaston The Chancellor of the Exchequer , 1980 .

[42]  Barry Eichengreen,et al.  Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area? , 1991 .

[43]  Kenneth Rogoff,et al.  The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation , 2002 .

[44]  Barry Eichengreen,et al.  Operationalizing the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas , 1998 .

[45]  Carmen M. Reinhart,et al.  The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems , 1996 .

[46]  P. Lane,et al.  Understanding Bilateral Exchange Rate Volatility , 2002 .

[47]  T. Willett,et al.  Testing the Unstable Middle and Two Corners Hypotheses About Exchange Rate Regimes , 2009 .

[48]  C. Pennington To PEG or not to PEG. , 2002, Clinical medicine.

[49]  K. Gleditsch,et al.  Expanded Trade and GDP Data , 2002 .

[50]  T. Willett,et al.  The Asian Crises Reexamined , 2004, Asian Economic Papers.

[51]  J. Broz,et al.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS , 2003 .

[52]  W. Nordhaus The Political Business Cycle , 1975 .

[53]  Vera E. Troeger,et al.  Monetary Policy Autonomy in European Non-Euro Countries, 1980–2005 , 2006 .

[54]  R. Barro,et al.  A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model , 1981, Journal of Political Economy.

[55]  R. Mundell The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and External Stability , 1962 .

[56]  Jay C. Shambaugh A new look at pass-through , 2008 .

[57]  A. Rose One Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade , 1999 .

[58]  A. Velasco,et al.  Exchange-Rate Policy for Developing Countries , 2000 .