Security protocols: from linear to classical logic by abstract interpretation

We relate two models of security protocols, namely the linear logic or multiset rewriting model, and the classical logic, Horn clause representation of protocols. More specifically, we show that the latter model is an abstraction of the former, in which the number of repetitions of each fact is forgotten. This result formally characterizes the approximations made by the classical logic model.

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