论文信息 - Practical Forgeries for ORANGE

Practical Forgeries for ORANGE

Abstract We analyze the authenticated encryption algorithm of ORANGE, a submission to the NIST lightweight cryptography standardization process. We show that it is practically possible to craft forgeries out of two observed transmitted messages that encrypt the same plaintext. The authors of ORANGE have confirmed the attack, and they discuss a fix for this attack in their second-round submission of ORANGE to the NIST lightweight cryptography competition.

[1] Guido Bertoni,et al. Duplexing the sponge: single-pass authenticated encryption and other applications , 2011, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[2] Morris J. Dworkin,et al. SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions , 2015 .

[3] Vincent Rijmen,et al. The Design of Rijndael , 2002, Information Security and Cryptography.

[4] Vincent Rijmen,et al. The Design of Rijndael: AES - The Advanced Encryption Standard , 2002 .