From Bounded Rationality to Expertise

Historically, a pervasive assumption in the social sciences, in particular economics, is that humans are perfect rational agents. Having full access to information and enjoying unlimited computational resources, they maximize utility when making decisions. As is well known, Herbert A. Simon rejected this assumption, calling it a fantasy for two main reasons. First, the complexity of the environment makes it impossible for humans to have full access to information. Second, a number of important restrictions impede the human cognitive system, such as limited attention and slow learning rates. Therefore, humans display only a bounded rationality and must satisfice, i.e., make decisions that are good enough, but not necessarily optimal.

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