How to Protect ADS-B: Confidentiality Framework and Efficient Realization Based on Staged Identity-Based Encryption

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is one of the key technologies for future “e-Enabled” aircrafts. ADS-B uses avionics in the e-Enabled aircrafts to broadcast essential flight data such as call sign, altitude, heading, and other extra positioning information. On the one hand, ADS-B brings significant benefits to the aviation industry, but, on the other hand, it could pose security concerns as channels between ground controllers and aircrafts for the ADS-B communication are not secured, and ADS-B messages could be captured by random individuals who own ADS-B receivers. In certain situations, ADS-B messages contain sensitive information, particularly when communications occur among mission-critical civil airplanes. These messages need to be protected from any interruption and eavesdropping. The challenge here is to construct an encryption scheme that is fast enough for very frequent encryption and that is flexible enough for effective key management. In this paper, we propose a Staged Identity-Based Encryption (SIBE) scheme, which modifies Boneh and Franklin's original IBE scheme to address those challenges, that is, to construct an efficient and functional encryption scheme for ADS-B system. Based on the proposed SIBE scheme, we provide a confidentiality framework for future e-Enabled aircraft with ADS-B capability.

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