Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
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Jeremy Clark | David Chaum | Alan T. Sherman | Richard Carback | Poorvi L. Vora | Aleksander Essex | Stefan Popoveniuc | D. Chaum | Jeremy Clark | A. Essex | A. Sherman | R. Carback | Stefan Popoveniuc | P. Vora
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