Computers, Guns, and Roses: What's Social about Being Shot?

Rob Kling's article (this issue), written in response to our previous critique of his work (Woolgar and Grint 1991) and to an earlier analysis of constructivist arguments in social studies of technology (Woolgar 1991), is stimulating and provocative. Kling raises issues of particular importance for the current convergence between the work of computer and social scientists: The increasing interest in "social" questions of many based within the computer sciences coincides with the increasing recognition by constructivist sociologists of the importance of computer technologies as a social phenomenon. This convergence also signals an opportunity of unusual potential in science and technology studies. For here we have the opportunity to forge alliances that transcend the usual distinction between analyst and practitioner. This makes it especially important to clarify the differences between us. In this article we concentrate on the three main criticisms of our argument made by Kling. Insofar as these criticisms apply in general to sociology of technology with constructivist inclinations, we hope to show how they are based on important misunderstandings of the scope of the sociology of technology. First, Kling accuses us of a "crusade against error" and of a claim to exclusive legitimacy in our theoretical approach to the social analysis of technology. Second, he says that sociologists take a self-denying ordinance that prevents them from engaging in practical debates and that thereby allows the powerful, and those with vested interests, to dominate public debates about technology. Third, and most significantly, Kling is alarmed by a theoretical account that appears to render technology irrelevant. Is there no difference, asks Kling, between guns and roses? What makes being shot a