论文信息 - The L4.verified Project - Next Steps

The L4.verified Project - Next Steps

Last year, the NICTA L4.verified project produced a formal machine-checked Isabelle/HOL proof that the C code of the seL4 OS microkernel correctly implements its abstract implementation. This paper gives a brief overview of the proof together with its main implications and assumptions, and paints a vision on how this verified kernel can be used for gaining assurance of overall system security on the code level for systems of a million lines of code or more.

Gerwin Klein | Gerwin Klein | G. Klein

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