Essays on optimal spectrum management for expanding wireless communications

Wireless communications are experiencing an unprecedented expansion. The increasing mobility of the communication society and the pace of technological change are growing pressure for more spectrum to support more users, more uses and more capacity. Thus, spectrum management has become an extremely important part of wireless communications. A few regulators are changing their traditional ‘command and control’ approach. Nevertheless, many features of optimal spectrum management are still widely discussed. This work is aimed at contributing to that discussion. The key insight is that spectrum management can benefit from more liberal spectrum sharing. This work set out to answer three main research questions: (i) whether there is a theoretical framework which can be used to analyze and guide spectrum policy reform, when moving from a traditional ‘command and control’ regime to a market-inspired one; (ii) whether it is possible to design a plausible mechanism which can promote efficient allocation and assignment of spectrum commons; (iii) whether (and how) technological developments could enable band sharing methods outside the traditional management framework and without harmful interference. The literature on transition economics and policy was used to help answer the first research question. Evidence from liberalizing countries was positively analyzed to discuss reforms of spectrum allocation and assignment methods. Most countries have adopted strategies that gradually change their spectrum policies and started by using more liberal methods to assign spectrum. It is also argued that future spectrum reforms might benefit from insights presented in the transition economics literature. A translation of a model on cartel quotas under majority rule is proposed to answer the second research question. The work verifies, firstly, that an analogous set of properties is satisfied under our assumptions and that the median-index theorem applies, mutatis mutandis, to our setting. Thus firms bidding to acquire spectrum commons contribute a minimum amount of their wealth; the sum of contributions offered is then compared to other bids for the same spectrum, which is allocated to the highest bidder. The last research question considers novel ways of spectrum sharing that might be enabled by technological developments. The work explores contributions, from various research areas, regarding management of scarce resources. Those contributions are discussed with respect to shared spectrum access. It is suggested that spectrum management might benefit from methods which enable the management of pooled (intermittent) demands for access, especially methods in line with fair sojourn protocols.

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