It is well established that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses the media to set the agenda for political discourse, propagate official policies, monitor public opinion, and rally regime support (Brady 2009; Hague & Harrop, 2010, p. 156). Effective use of the media as a political tool is always a top CCP priority. The regime’s media strategies are formulated at the highest level in the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. The strategies are implemented by the Publicity Department of the Central Committee, which oversees operations of the state media organizations. Other relevant official agencies include the State Press and Publication Administration (for print media control); the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (broadcast media control); and the Ministry of Information Industry (responsible for digital media control). Finally, the New China News Agency (Xinhua) is entrusted with the task of gathering and distributing information. Thus, state agencies control the full spectrum of media programming, either through ownership or the power to regulate. On the surface at least, the extent of official control over media organizations suggests that China remains a prototypical case of an authoritarian media system (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956). In fact, however, dramatic increases in the size and diversity of the Chinese media market1 have created openings for private owners and a gradual loosening of party control. Two factors contributed to the rapid development of media infrastructure in China: technology and commercialization. Economic development led to technological advancement, which in turn brought about the rapid modernization of all forms of communication, from “old” media such as television to the Internet, cell phones, and satellite communications. Today, private and quasiprivate media organizations operate in a competitive environment where programming decisions reflect not only the political goals of the CCP, but also the economic logic of increased audience size and advertising revenue. The six articles making up this special issue of Political Communication examine how these recent developments have affected the relationship between the CCP and the mass
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