Reciprocity and the Welfare State

Thermostatic switch having a broad area, plate-like main heater between a bimetal member and a cantilever-mounted leaf spring mobile contact carrier. A dielectric block supports the mounted end of the mobile contact carrier and one end of the main heater, as well as the bimetal member. This block is mounted on a metal base plate which also supports a stationary contact for engagement by a mobile contact on the free end of the contact carrier. The foregoing abstract is merely a resume of one general application, is not a complete discussion of all principles of operation or applications, and is not to be construed as a limitation on the scope of the claimed subject matter.

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