UDP-OR: A Fair Onion Transport Design

Low latency anonymity systems face many challenges. One of them is how to fairly allocate network resources among many unknown users and applications. This paper presents a design for a end-to-end inspired transport mechanism for onion routers. The design uses the same solutions and implementations that had made the Internet scale. We compare an implementation of the design with Tor’s (the third generation onion router) 1 and show initial benefits of the design.

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