Cyclic vs. circular argumentation in the Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Abstract In current debates Lakoff and Johnson's Conceptual Metaphor Theory has been charged with the circularity of the relation between the data and the hypotheses. If these charges were justified, they would be fatal for Conceptual Metaphor Theory, because circularity is one of the most serious objections that can be raised against a scientific approach. Accordingly, the paper addresses the following problems: (1) Are the charges claiming that Lakoff and Johnson's Conceptual Metaphor Theory is circular adequate? (2) In what kind of metatheoretical framework can it be decided whether a given argumentation is circular? (3) Is Lakoff and Johnson's Conceptual Metaphor Theory built on circular argumentation? The paper answers these questions as follows: (1) The charges mentioned are not adequate because they are based on defective notions of circularity. (2) An approach to plausible argumentation is proposed. It includes a novel account of fallacies, which facilitates a more adequate definition of circularity than those which the charges use. (3) This novel account yields the result that Lakoff and Johnson's (Metaphors we live by, The University of Chicago Press, 1980) and Lakoff's (The contemporary theory of metaphor, Cambridge University Press, 1993) argumentation is cyclic rather than circular, but the way it treats data includes circular aspects as well.

[1]  G. Lakoff,et al.  Metaphors We Live By , 1980 .

[2]  David B. Ritchie.  Categories and Similarities: A Note on Circularity , 2003 .

[3]  M. Leezenberg,et al.  Contexts of metaphor , 2001 .

[4]  Nicholas Rescher,et al.  Plausible reasoning , 1976 .

[5]  N. Rescher,et al.  The coherence theory of truth , 1973 .

[6]  Tanja Gradečak-Erdeljić,et al.  Zoltán Kövecses: Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling. Cambridge University Press & Editions de la Maison des Sciences d , 2005 .

[7]  G. Fauconnier,et al.  The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind''s Hidden Complexities. Basic Books , 2002 .

[8]  D. Walton.  Abductive, presumptive and plausible arguments , 2001 .

[9]  R. Dirven,et al.  The contested impact of cognitive linguistic research on the psycholinguistics of metaphor understanding , 2006 .

[10]  S. Glucksberg.  Understanding figurative language : from metaphors to idioms , 2001 .

[11]  D. Geeraerts.  Methodology in cognitive linguistics , 2006 .

[12]  Verena Haser,et al.  Metaphor, Metonymy, and Experientialist Philosophy: Challenging Cognitive Semantics , 2005 .

[13]  Marina Rakova,et al.  The philosophy of embodied realism: A high price to pay? , 2002 .

[14]  F. H. Eemeren,et al.  A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach , 2003 .

[15]  O. Oha.  Fallacies , 2005 .

[16]  S. Vereza.  Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought , 2001 .

[17]  Z. Kövecses,et al.  Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling , 2000 .

[18]  András Kertész.  Cognitive Semantics and Scientific Knowledge: Case studies in the cognitive science of science , 2004 .

[19]  S. Glucksberg.  The psycholinguistics of metaphor , 2003, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[20]  Nicholas Rescher,et al.  The logic of inconsistency , 1979 .

[21]  A. Kertész,et al.  Remarks on the cognitive base of pragmatic principles , 2005 .

[22]  Marina Rakova,et al.  Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics , 2003 .

[23]  D. Walton.  A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy , 1995 .

[24]  Anatol Stefanowitsch,et al.  Corpora in cognitive linguistics : corpus-based approaches to syntax and lexis , 2006 .

[25]  A. Kertész,et al.  Whole-part and part-whole inferences in generative and cognitive linguistics , 2005 .

[26]  A. Kertész,et al.  Inconsistency and plausible reasoning in an analysis of German affricates: A case study in the philosophy of linguistics , 2006 .

[27]  G. Lakoff,et al.  Philosophy in the flesh : the embodied mind and its challenge to Western thought , 1999 .

[28]  Robert G. Kraft.  The Death of Argument. , 1975 .

[29]  Kenneth D. Forbus,et al.  A Theory of Rerepresentation in Analogical Matching , 2003 .

[30]  Raymond W. Gibbs,et al.  Introspection and cognitive linguistics: Should we trust our own intuitions? , 2006 .

[31]  R. Gibbs.  Embodiment and Cognitive Science: Concepts , 2005 .

[32]  G. Pólya.  Patterns of plausible inference , 1970 .

[33]  George Lakoff.  Image Schemas: From Linguistic Analysis to Neural Grounding , 2005 .

[34]  Z. Kövecses,et al.  Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation , 2005 .

[35]  Brian F. Bowdle,et al.  Convention, Form, and Figurative Language Processing , 2001 .

[36]  G. Lakoff.  The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor , 1993 .

[37]  Sam Glucksberg,et al.  Concepts as Metaphors , 2001 .

[38]  Michel Achard,et al.  Three dogmas of embodiment: Cognitive linguistics as a cognitive science , 2006 .