Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods
暂无分享,去创建一个
Erel Segal-Halevi | Avinatan Hassidim | Yonatan Aumann | Avinatan Hassidim | Y. Aumann | Erel Segal-Halevi
[1] Maria-Florina Balcan,et al. Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning , 2007, J. Comput. Syst. Sci..
[2] Enxin Yao,et al. An efficient truthful double spectrum auction design for dynamic spectrum access , 2011, 2011 6th International ICST Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks and Communications (CROWNCOM).
[3] Sanmay Das,et al. Price Evolution in a Continuous Double Auction Prediction Market With a Scoring-Rule Based Market Maker , 2015, AAAI.
[4] Zuo-Jun Max Shen,et al. Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism , 2006, Manag. Sci..
[5] Moshe Babaioff,et al. Incentive Compatible Supply Chain Auctions , 2006 .
[6] Ilan Newman,et al. Ascending auctions and Walrasian equilibrium , 2013, ArXiv.
[7] Paul W. Goldberg,et al. Fixed Price Approximability of the Optimal Gain from Trade , 2017, WINE.
[8] Tim Roughgarden,et al. The Pseudo-Dimension of Near-Optimal Auctions , 2015, NIPS 2015.
[9] Shahar Dobzinski,et al. Reallocation mechanisms , 2014, EC.
[10] Rica Gonen,et al. Generalized trade reduction mechanisms , 2007, EC '07.
[11] Faruk Gul,et al. WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM WITH GROSS SUBSTITUTES , 1999 .
[12] Andrew V. Goldberg,et al. Competitive auctions and digital goods , 2001, SODA '01.
[13] Uriel Feige,et al. On the Competitive Ratio of the Random Sampling Auction , 2005, WINE.
[14] Qiqi Yan,et al. Mechanism design via correlation gap , 2010, SODA '11.
[15] Gerhard J. Woeginger,et al. Operations Research Letters , 2011 .
[16] F. A. Hayek. The American Economic Review , 2007 .
[17] Thomas P. Hayes,et al. The adwords problem: online keyword matching with budgeted bidders under random permutations , 2009, EC '09.
[18] Ilya Segal,et al. Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation , 2017, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[19] Baochun Li,et al. District: Embracing local markets in truthful spectrum double auctions , 2011, 2011 8th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks.
[20] Justin Hsu,et al. Do prices coordinate markets? , 2015, SECO.
[21] Erel Segal-Halevi,et al. Concentration Inequalities for Random Sets , 2016 .
[22] Kazuo Murota. Multiple Exchange Property for M♮-Concave Functions and Valuated Matroids , 2018, Math. Oper. Res..
[23] Moshe Babaioff,et al. Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market , 2009, Games Econ. Behav..
[24] Nikhil R. Devanur,et al. Prior-Independent Multi-parameter Mechanism Design , 2011, WINE.
[25] Nikhil R. Devanur,et al. Random Sampling Auctions for Limited Supply , 2007 .
[26] Shuchi Chawla,et al. Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling , 2013, STOC '13.
[27] Steven R. Williams,et al. Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information , 1994 .
[28] O. Bagasra,et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 1914, Science.
[29] Ilya Segal,et al. Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand , 2002 .
[30] Moshe Babaioff,et al. Concurrent auctions across the supply chain , 2001, EC '01.
[31] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Modularity and greed in double auctions , 2014, Games Econ. Behav..
[32] Nikhil R. Devanur,et al. Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design , 2012, J. Econ. Theory.
[33] Moshe Babaioff,et al. Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation , 2003, EC '03.
[34] Jason D. Hartline,et al. Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing , 2009, STOC '10.
[35] Baochun Li,et al. A Secondary Market for Spectrum , 2010, 2010 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM.
[36] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions , 2016, EC.
[37] M. Satterthwaite,et al. Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading , 1983 .
[38] XiaoHua Xu,et al. TODA: Truthful Online Double Auction for Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks , 2010, 2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum (DySPAN).
[39] N. Nisan. Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists) , 2007 .
[40] Bo Li,et al. TAHES: Truthful double Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrums , 2012, 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM.
[41] Erel Segal-Halevi,et al. MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism , 2017, AAAI.
[42] Anna R. Karlin,et al. Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions , 2002, ESA.
[43] Erel Segal-Halevi,et al. SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism , 2016, SAGT.
[44] R. Vohra,et al. Market Research and Market Design , 2003 .
[45] Xia Zhou,et al. TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions , 2009, IEEE INFOCOM 2009.
[46] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Making the Most of Your Samples , 2014, EC.
[47] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Revenue maximization with a single sample , 2010, EC '10.
[48] Vladimir Vapnik,et al. Chervonenkis: On the uniform convergence of relative frequencies of events to their probabilities , 1971 .
[49] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..
[50] J. Meigs,et al. WHO Technical Report , 1954, The Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine.
[51] Richard Cole,et al. The sample complexity of revenue maximization , 2014, STOC.
[52] Renato Paes Leme,et al. On the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism , 2013, EC.
[53] Ennio Stacchetti,et al. The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.
[54] Rica Gonen,et al. DYCOM: A Dynamic Truthful Budget Balanced Double-sided Combinatorial Market , 2017, AAMAS.
[55] Liad Blumrosen,et al. Posted prices vs. negotiations: an asymptotic analysis , 2008, EC '08.
[56] Aravind Srinivasan,et al. On random sampling auctions for digital goods , 2009, EC '09.
[57] Erel Segal-Halevi,et al. Demand-flow of agents with gross-substitute valuations , 2016, Oper. Res. Lett..
[58] R. McAfee,et al. A dominant strategy double auction , 1992 .
[59] M. D. Wilkinson,et al. Management science , 1989, British Dental Journal.
[60] Yang Cai,et al. Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms , 2017, EC.
[61] Hiroshi Hirai,et al. Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-sided Markets , 2017, Math. Oper. Res..
[62] Shuchi Chawla,et al. Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations , 2007, EC '07.
[63] William Vickrey,et al. Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .
[64] Anna R. Karlin,et al. Competitive auctions , 2006, Games Econ. Behav..
[65] Parag A. Pathak,et al. Appendix to "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets" , 2009 .