Computer virus propagation model based on bounded rationality evolutionary game theory

Increasing spread of computer viruses has caused huge economic losses and psychological influence on people's lives, so building an effective computer virus propagation model to predict the propagation of viruses is necessary. Classical computer virus propagation models can predict the propagation tendency of computer viruses, but they cannot accurately quantify the loss of the user because of these models only were considered from the view of the node connection rate and did not consider the various factors of the participators oneself. In this paper, under the conditions of bounded rationality, the evolutionary game theory is used for building computer virus propagation model. By referencing “replication dynamic” thought, the long-term evolutionary trend of the normal competitive game between normal users and potential attacks using the evolution strategy can be described. According to the Liapunov theorem, the equilibrium and stability of the proposed model are also discussed. Finally, by simulation analysis, we determine the impact of some important parameters of the proposed model for virus propagation. Simulation results show that the proposed model can provide theoretical support for predicting computer virus propagation. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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