Satisficing Negotiation for Resource Allocation with Disputed Resources

Satisficing decision making provides a more malleable framework for negotiation than conventional techniques based on optimization of a utility function. In this paper we summarize satisficing decision theory, which provides a mechanism for determining decision options which are "good enough" as as tradeoff between a selectability function and a rejectability function, with an index of caution as a decision control parameter. Single agent satisficing is extended to multi-agent satisficing, by which group rationality can be represented; option vectors for the entire group are obtained as a result of this decision process. Multi-agent satisficing provides the stage upon which negotiation takes place. Negotiation. in this context, is the process by which all agents determine a set of options which are both individually satisficing and jointly satisficing; through the course of negotiation agents can accommodate the needs of the group -- compromise -- through lowering their index of caution. An example is presented of resource allocation with disputed resources.