Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967–99

This study examines the influence of civil–military relations on military effectiveness. More specifically, we investigate how coup-proofing, that is, the strategies and tactics employed to prevent the military from seizing power, affects battlefield performance. The main argument claims that coup-proofing has a negative impact on soldiers’ leadership qualities, initiative, and the ability to coordinate different military units. Ultimately, the higher a country’s coup-proofing efforts relative to its opponent, the worse its effectiveness on the battlefield. We test this hypothesis using data on battlefield outcomes and coup-proofing between 1967 and 1999.

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