Selecting Time Samples for Multivariate DPA Attacks

Masking on the algorithm level, i.e. concealing all sensitive intermediate values with random data, is a popular countermeasure against DPA attacks. A properly implemented masking scheme forces an attacker to apply a higher-order DPA attack. Such attacks are known to require a number of traces growing exponentially in the attack order, and computational power growing combinatorially in the number of time samples that have to be exploited jointly. We present a novel technique to identify such tuples of time samples before key recovery, in black-box conditions and using only known inputs (or outputs). Attempting key recovery only once the tuples have been identified can reduce the computational complexity of the overall attack substantially, e.g. from months to days. Experimental results based on power traces of a masked software implementation of the AES confirm the effectiveness of our method and show exemplary speed-ups.

[1]  Stefan Mangard,et al.  Practical Second-Order DPA Attacks for Masked Smart Card Implementations of Block Ciphers , 2006, CT-RSA.

[2]  Christof Paar,et al.  Gaussian Mixture Models for Higher-Order Side Channel Analysis , 2007, CHES.

[3]  David A. Wagner,et al.  Towards Efficient Second-Order Power Analysis , 2004, CHES.

[4]  Lejla Batina,et al.  Mutual Information Analysis: a Comprehensive Study , 2011, Journal of Cryptology.

[5]  Thanh-Ha Le,et al.  Mutual Information Analysis under the View of Higher-Order Statistics , 2010, IWSEC.

[6]  Siva Sai Yerubandi,et al.  Differential Power Analysis , 2002 .

[7]  Bart Preneel,et al.  Mutual Information Analysis A Generic Side-Channel Distinguisher , 2008 .

[8]  Christophe Clavier,et al.  Correlation Power Analysis with a Leakage Model , 2004, CHES.

[9]  Marc Joye,et al.  Side-Channel Analysis , 2005, Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security.

[10]  Louis Goubin,et al.  DES and Differential Power Analysis (The "Duplication" Method) , 1999, CHES.

[11]  Thomas S. Messerges,et al.  Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software , 2000, CHES.

[12]  Marc Joye,et al.  On Second-Order Differential Power Analysis , 2005, CHES.

[13]  Emmanuel Prouff,et al.  Theoretical and practical aspects of mutual information-based side channel analysis , 2010, Int. J. Appl. Cryptogr..

[14]  Paul C. Kocher,et al.  Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems , 1996, CRYPTO.

[15]  Alexandre Venelli,et al.  Efficient Entropy Estimation for Mutual Information Analysis Using B-Splines , 2010, WISTP.

[16]  Pankaj Rohatgi,et al.  Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks , 1999, CRYPTO.

[17]  Markus Kasper,et al.  The World is Not Enough: Another Look on Second-Order DPA , 2010, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[18]  Emmanuel Prouff,et al.  Statistical Analysis of Second Order Differential Power Analysis , 2009, IEEE Transactions on Computers.

[19]  François-Xavier Standaert,et al.  Mutual Information Analysis: How, When and Why? , 2009, CHES.

[20]  Bart Preneel,et al.  Revisiting Higher-Order DPA Attacks: Multivariate Mutual Information Analysis. , 2009 .

[21]  Christof Paar,et al.  Higher Order Masking of the AES , 2006, CT-RSA.

[22]  Stefan Mangard,et al.  An AES Smart Card Implementation Resistant to Power Analysis Attacks , 2006, ACNS.

[23]  Bart Preneel,et al.  Mutual Information Analysis , 2008, CHES.

[24]  Elisabeth Oswald,et al.  A Comprehensive Evaluation of Mutual Information Analysis Using a Fair Evaluation Framework , 2011, CRYPTO.

[25]  Dakshi Agrawal,et al.  The EM Side-Channel(s) , 2002, CHES.