Venture Capital and Risk in High-Technology Enterprises

We find UK investors and entrepreneurs are significantly concordant in rankings of investments and key factors for risk but significantly discordant on risk classes. Investors emphasise agency risk (e.g., motivation, empowerment, alignment), and entrepreneurs emphasise business risk (e.g., market opportunities).

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