Static Validation of a Voting Protocol

The desired security properties of electronic voting protocols include verifiability, accuracy, democracy and fairness. In this paper we use a static program analysis tool to validate these properties for one of the classical voting protocols under appropriate assumptions. The protocol is formalised in an extension of the LySa process calculus with blinding signatures. The analysis, which is fully automatic, pinpoints previously undiscovered flaws related to verifiability and accuracy and we suggest modifications of the protocol needed for validating these properties.

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