Many inter-State and intra-State conflicts in Africa become more complex by being extended into 'proxy wars', i.e. secondary, often 'low intensity' armed conflicts, pursued in the context of a major power struggle, or outright wars between States carried out by subsidiary or co-opted insurgent movements, usually of an ethno-regional nature. In the Horn of Africa, the proxy war phenomenon is visible owing to alliances behind the scenes, the involvement of neighbouring countries, and frequent changes of allegiance. The proxy war strategy was pursued by both players in the 1998-2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, not only in the enemy country but also in neighbouring States. Since the peace agreement of June 2000, the importance and impact of the proxy war factor has declined somewhat, but whether this decline will contribute to the building of a 'lasting peace' is not at all certain. The experience of tenuous negotiation during the past two years seems to indicate otherwise. The author argues that the threat of regional instability by proxy conflict remains, as long as the Ethiopian and Eritrean regimes are unwilling to make real peace with each other. App. (list of insurgent movements), bibliogr., notes, ref. [ASC Leiden abstract]
[1]
R. Joseph.
Africa: States in Crisis
,
2003
.
[2]
G. Abbink.
Dervishes, moryaan and freedom fighters: Cycles of rebellion and the fragmentation of Somali society, 1900–2000
,
2003,
Rethinking Resistance.
[3]
T. Mkandawire.
The terrible toll of post-colonial ‘rebel movements’ in Africa: towards an explanation of the violence against the peasantry
,
2002,
The Journal of Modern African Studies.
[4]
P. Milkias.
The great purge and ideological paradox in contemporary Ethiopian politics
,
2001
.
[5]
J. Young.
Along Ethiopia's western frontier: Gambella and Benishangul in transition
,
1999,
The Journal of Modern African Studies.