论文信息 - Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship

Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship

Two fundamental problems in economics are voting and assignment. In both settings, random serial dictatorship is a well-established mechanism that satisfies anonymity, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. We present an overview of recent results on the computational complexity of problems related to random serial dictatorship.

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