Approximating maxmin strategies in imperfect recall games using A-loss recall property
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Branislav Bosanský | Karel Horák | Michal Pechoucek | Viliam Lisý | Jiri Cermak | V. Lisý | B. Bosanský | Jiri Cermak | K. Horák | M. Pěchouček
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