Norms, Coordination, and Order

The dissemination of knowledge is crucial in society. People live in a world of expectations about interactions with others’ actions. It is meaningful to discuss the social order only when all agents share the same perception of existing reality which includes others’ actions. People follow rules of behavior in society. Relying on rules is a device we have learned to use because our reason is insufficient to master the detail of complex reality. If rules are recognized as recurrent patterns of behavior, individuals act according to rules of conduct. The diffusion of shared behavioral patterns is necessary to obtain the social order. Shared rules facilitate the decision-making in complex situations by limiting the range of circumstances to which individuals have to pay attention.

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