Temporal Languages for Epistemic Programs

This paper adds temporal logic to public announcement logic (PAL) and dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). By adding a previous-time operator to PAL, we express in the language statements concerning the muddy children puzzle and sum and product. We also express a true statement that an agent’s beliefs about another agent’s knowledge flipped twice, and use a sound proof system to prove this statement. Adding a next-time operator to PAL, we provide formulas that express that belief revision does not take place in PAL. We also discuss relationships between announcements and the new knowledge agents thus acquire; such relationships are related to learning and to Fitch’s paradox. We also show how inverse programs and hybrid logic each can be used to help determine whether or not an arbitrary structure represents the play of a game. We then add a past-time operator to DEL, and discuss the importance of adding yet another component to the language in order to prove completeness.

[1]  Lawrence S. Moss,et al.  Logics for Epistemic Programs , 2004, Synthese.

[2]  Berit Brogaard,et al.  Fitch's Paradox of Knowability , 2002 .

[3]  John L. Pollock,et al.  Basic modal logic , 1967, Journal of Symbolic Logic.

[4]  D. Peled,et al.  Temporal Logic: Mathematical Foundations and Computational Aspects, Volume 1 , 1995 .

[5]  Joshua Sack,et al.  Logic for update products and steps into the past , 2010, Ann. Pure Appl. Log..

[6]  Johan van Benthem,et al.  The Tree of Knowledge in Action: Towards a Common Perspective , 2006, Advances in Modal Logic.

[7]  W. van der Hoek,et al.  Epistemic logic for AI and computer science , 1995, Cambridge tracts in theoretical computer science.

[8]  Joshua Sack,et al.  Adding temporal logic to dynamic epistemic logic , 2007 .

[9]  Peter Gärdenfors,et al.  On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions , 1985, Journal of Symbolic Logic.

[10]  D. Gabbay,et al.  Temporal Logic Mathematical Foundations and Computational Aspects , 1994 .

[11]  G. E. Moore,et al.  Commonplace Book: 1919-1953 , 1993 .

[12]  Johan van Benthem,et al.  What one may come to know , 2004 .

[13]  Lawrence S. Moss,et al.  The Undecidability of Iterated Modal Relativization , 2005, Stud Logica.

[14]  J. Gerbrandy Bisimulations on Planet Kripke , 1999 .

[15]  Mark Reynolds,et al.  Axioms for Logics of Knowledge and Past Time: Synchrony and Unique Initial States , 2004, Advances in Modal Logic.

[16]  Michael Dummett,et al.  Fitch's Paradox of Knowability , 2009 .

[17]  Alexandru Baltag,et al.  Conditional Doxastic Models: A Qualitative Approach to Dynamic Belief Revision , 2006, WoLLIC.

[18]  Rineke Verbrugge,et al.  Sum and Product in Dynamic Epistemic Logic , 2008, J. Log. Comput..

[19]  D. Nute Topics in Conditional Logic , 1980 .

[20]  Jan A. Plaza,et al.  Logics of public communications , 2007, Synthese.

[21]  J. Benthem,et al.  Diversity of Logical Agents in Games , 2004 .

[22]  Ronald Fagin,et al.  Reasoning about knowledge , 1995 .

[23]  Ramaswamy Ramanujam,et al.  A Knowledge Based Semantics of Messages , 2003, J. Log. Lang. Inf..

[24]  Andreas Herzig,et al.  What can we achieve by arbitrary announcements?: A dynamic take on Fitch's knowability , 2007, TARK '07.