Towards a Game Theory Model of Information Warfare

Abstract : The repeated game of incomplete information model, a subclass of game theory models, was modified to include aspects of information warfare. The repeated game of incomplete information model was first developed to analyze nuclear weapons disarmament negotiations. The central role of information in this model suggested its applicability to IW, which focuses on the defense and acquisition of information. A randomized experimental design was utilized to determine how people behave in a laboratory IW setting and to test the IW game model's basic predictions. The impact of experience and learning on IW performance was also assessed during the experiment. IW experience and devices that support learning during an IW engagement improved performance in some situations. The IW game theory model was shown to have some predictive capability and, with further development, could support further IW analysis and simulation.

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