Complexity and Approximation of the Continuous Network Design Problem

We revisit a classical problem in transportation, known as the continuous (bilevel) network design problem, CNDP for short. We are given a graph for which the latency of each edge depends on the ratio of the edge flow and the capacity installed. The goal is to find an optimal investment in edge capacities so as to minimize the sum of the routing cost of the induced Wardrop equilibrium and the investment cost. While this problem is considered as challenging in the literature, its complexity status was still unknown. We close this gap showing that CNDP is strongly NP-complete and APX-hard, both on directed and undirected networks and even for instances with affine latencies. As for the approximation of the problem, we first provide a detailed analysis for a heuristic studied by Marcotte for the special case of monomial latency functions (Mathematical Programming, Vol.~34, 1986). Specifically, we derive a closed form expression of its approximation guarantee for arbitrary sets S of allowed latency functions. Second, we propose a different approximation algorithm and show that it has the same approximation guarantee. As our final -- and arguably most interesting -- result regarding approximation, we show that using the better of the two approximation algorithms results in a strictly improved approximation guarantee for which we give a closed form expression. For affine latencies, e.g., this algorithm achieves a 1.195-approximation which improves on the 5/4 that has been shown before by Marcotte. We finally discuss the case of hard budget constraints on the capacity investment.

[1]  Ariel Orda,et al.  The designer's perspective to atomic noncooperative networks , 1999, TNET.

[2]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  On the severity of Braess's Paradox: Designing networks for selfish users is hard , 2006, J. Comput. Syst. Sci..

[3]  Stella Dafermos,et al.  Traffic Equilibrium and Variational Inequalities , 1980 .

[4]  David E. Boyce,et al.  Transportation network equilibrium , 2015 .

[5]  Marek Karpinski,et al.  Approximation Hardness and Satisfiability of Bounded Occurrence Instances of SAT , 2003, Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex..

[6]  Patrice Marcotte,et al.  Efficient implementation of heuristics for the continuous network design problem , 1992, Ann. Oper. Res..

[7]  Patrice Marcotte,et al.  An overview of bilevel optimization , 2007, Ann. Oper. Res..

[8]  Dietrich Braess,et al.  Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung , 1968, Unternehmensforschung.

[9]  Bethany L. Nicholson,et al.  Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints , 2021, Pyomo — Optimization Modeling in Python.

[10]  Ariel Orda,et al.  Architecting noncooperative networks , 1995, Eighteenth Convention of Electrical and Electronics Engineers in Israel.

[11]  Ariel Orda,et al.  Avoiding the Braess paradox in non-cooperative networks , 1999, Journal of Applied Probability.

[12]  Ravindra K. Ahuja,et al.  Network Flows: Theory, Algorithms, and Applications , 1993 .

[13]  Hai Yang,et al.  Models and algorithms for road network design: a review and some new developments , 1998 .

[14]  Yin Zhang,et al.  On selfish routing in Internet-like environments , 2003, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking.

[15]  J. G. Wardrop,et al.  Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research , 1952 .

[16]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Braess's Paradox in large random graphs , 2010 .

[17]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  How bad is selfish routing? , 2000, Proceedings 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.

[18]  José R. Correa,et al.  Sloan School of Management Working Paper 4319-03 June 2003 Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks , 2022 .

[19]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Stronger Bounds on Braess's Paradox and the Maximum Latency of Selfish Routing , 2011, SIAM J. Discret. Math..

[20]  Thomas L. Magnanti,et al.  Network Design and Transportation Planning: Models and Algorithms , 1984, Transp. Sci..

[21]  George B. Dantzig,et al.  Formulating and solving the network design problem by decomposition , 1979 .

[22]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology , 2002, STOC '02.

[23]  Marek Karpinski,et al.  Approximation Hardness of Short Symmetric Instances of MAX-3SAT , 2003, Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex..

[24]  Larry J. LeBlanc,et al.  CONTINUOUS EQUILIBRIUM NETWORK DESIGN MODELS , 1979 .

[25]  Mike Smith,et al.  The existence, uniqueness and stability of traffic equilibria , 1979 .

[26]  Pradeep Dubey,et al.  Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria , 1986, Math. Oper. Res..

[27]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Braess's Paradox in large random graphs , 2006, EC '06.

[28]  Patrice Marcotte,et al.  Network design problem with congestion effects: A case of bilevel programming , 1983, Math. Program..

[29]  A. C. Pigou Economics of welfare , 1920 .

[30]  S. Meyn,et al.  THE EXISTENCE OF AN “I” , 2020, The Nature of Order, Book 4: The Luminous Ground.

[31]  Leonard J. Schulman,et al.  The Network Improvement Problem for Equilibrium Routing , 2013, ArXiv.

[32]  L. Lovász,et al.  Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial Optimization , 1981 .

[33]  小泉 信三 社会政策の原理 : Pigou, The economics of welfareを読む , 1923 .

[34]  Leonard J. Schulman,et al.  Network Improvement for Equilibrium Routing , 2014, IPCO.

[35]  Terry L. Friesz,et al.  TRANSPORTATION NETWORK EQUILIBRIUM, DESIGN AND AGGREGATION: KEY DEVELOPMENTS AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES. IN: THE AUTOMOBILE , 1985 .