A behaviorist's definition of consciousness.

This paper should have been called "The frantic attempt of a behaviorist to define consciousness." In fact, the doctrine I shall present seems even to me quite unprovable and to you it will no doubt seem something far worse. And yet so great is my faith that behaviorism must ultimately triumph that I should rather present even the following quite doubtful hypothesis than hold my mouth and say nothing. If we behaviorists can not present good theories, we can at least present as many bad ones as possible in order that by their successive refutation we may be forced finally either into discovering the correct theory, or, if there be none, into abandoning our behavioristic adventure altogether. Before, however, attempting my definition of consciousness, let me first briefly outline the nature of behavior as I see it. Every behavior-act, in so far as its continued going-off is contingent upon there proving to be such and such specific features in the environment, must be said in so far to postulate or cognize those features. For example, when a rat, after learning, is ready to enter only the white alley of a discrimination box, and not the black alley, the continuance of this 'white-entering' behavior must be said to express a cognitive postulation as to the difference between white and black. Further, the fact that the continuance of this tendency to enter the white and not the black is also contingent upon the further circumstance that there prove to be a difference between food and non-food on the two sides of the box must be said to express also a cognitive differentiation between food and non-food. And, thirdly, the continuance of this entering