论文信息 - Inspector Leadership with Incomplete Information

Inspector Leadership with Incomplete Information

Inspection problems arise when an inspector has to decide whether an inspectee has behaved legally, i.e., according to a formal agreement. For such a decision the inspector uses a well-defined procedure which is based on observations of random variables and which may or may not be announced to the inspectee.

Akira Okada | Shmuel Zamir | Rudolf Avenhaus

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