Political districting without geography

Geographical considerations such as contiguity and compactness are necessary elements of political districting in practice. Yet an analysis of the problem without such constraints yields mathematical insights that can inform real-world model construction. In particular, it clarifies the sharp contrast between proportionality and competitiveness and how it might be overcome in a properly formulated objective function. It also reveals serious weaknesses of the much-discussed efficiency gap as a criterion for gerrymandering.

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