Signaling with Commitment

We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power. We provide a geometric characterization of the sender's attainable payoffs, described by the topological join of the graphs of the sender's interim payoff functions associated with different sender actions. We compare the sender's payoffs in this setting with two benchmarks. In the first, in addition to committing to her actions, the sender can commit to provide the receiver with additional information. In the second, the sender can only commit to release information, but cannot commit to her actions. We illustrate our results with applications to job market signaling, communication with lying costs, and disclosure.

[1]  Andrew Wojtanik.  Constraining Dictatorship: from personalized rule to institutionalized regimes by Anne Meng Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. 278. $105 (hbk). , 2022, The Journal of Modern African Studies.

[2]  E. Mitrokhina.  Constraining dictatorship: from personalized rule to institutionalized regimes , 2021, Democratization.

[3]  D. Ravid,et al.  Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives , 2020, Econometrica.

[4]  Emir Kamenica,et al.  Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design , 2019, Annual Review of Economics.

[5]  O. Tamuz,et al.  The Cost of Information: The Case of Constant Marginal Costs , 2018, American Economic Review.

[6]  Pak Hung Au,et al.  Competitive Information Disclosure by Multiple Senders , 2018, Games Econ. Behav..

[7]  D. Bergemann,et al.  Information Design: A Unified Perspective , 2017, Journal of Economic Literature.

[8]  Daniel Quigley,et al.  Persuasion for the Long Run , 2016, Journal of Political Economy.

[9]  Ricardo Alonso,et al.  Persuading Voters , 2015 .

[10]  Mehdi Shadmehr,et al.  Institutions, Repression and the Spread of Protest , 2015 .

[11]  Jun Zhang,et al.  Information Disclosure in Contests: A Bayesian Persuasion Approach , 2015 .

[12]  Raphael Boleslavsky,et al.  Grading Standards and Education Quality , 2014 .

[13]  Raphael Boleslavsky,et al.  Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production , 2014 .

[14]  Andrew Caplin,et al.  Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Acquisition , 2014 .

[15]  Emir Kamenica,et al.  Bayesian Persuasion , 2009 .

[16]  Navin Kartik,et al.  Strategic Communication with Lying Costs , 2009 .

[17]  Navin Kartik,et al.  Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk , 2007, J. Econ. Theory.

[18]  P. DeMarzo.  The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation , 2005 .

[19]  S. Hart,et al.  Long Cheap Talk , 2003 .

[20]  C. Sims.  Implications of rational inattention , 2003 .

[21]  Jeffrey S. Banks,et al.  Signalling Games in Political Science , 2002 .

[22]  Andrea Prat,et al.  Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability , 2002 .

[23]  S. Chapman.  Advertising as information , 1999 .

[24]  Colin Camerer.  Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols , 1988, American Journal of Sociology.

[25]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality , 1986, Journal of Political Economy.

[26]  R. Dye.  DISCLOSURE OF NONPROPRIETARY INFORMATION , 1985 .

[27]  Hayne E. Leland,et al.  INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION , 1977 .

[28]  M. Spence.  Job Market Signaling , 1973 .

[29]  Mehdi Shadmehr,et al.  State Censorship , 2014 .

[30]  Matthew Gentzkow,et al.  Costly Persuasion , 2013 .

[31]  Andrew Caplin,et al.  Revealed Preference, Rational Inattention, and Costly Information Processing , 2013 .

[32]  D. Duffie,et al.  A liquidity-based model of security design , 1999 .

[33]  K. Bagwell,et al.  High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality , 1991 .