Symbolic negotiation: Partial deduction for linear logic with coalition formation

The deregulation of the electricity industry in many countries has created a number of marketplaces in which producers and consumers can operate in order to more effectively manage and meet their energy needs. To this end, this paper develops a new model for electricity retail where end-use customers choose their supplier from competing electricity retailers. The model is based on simultaneous reverse combinatorial auctions, designed as a second-price sealed-bid multi-item auction with supply function bidding. This model prevents strategic bidding and allows the auctioneer to maximise its payoff. Furthermore, we develop optimal single-item and multi-item algorithms for winner determination in such auctions that are significantly less complex than those currently available in the literature.

[1]  Theodore Groves,et al.  Incentives in Teams , 1973 .

[2]  A. Tversky,et al.  On the psychology of prediction , 1973 .

[3]  M. L. Fisher,et al.  An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—I , 1978, Math. Program..

[4]  Refael Hassin,et al.  Approximation Schemes for the Restricted Shortest Path Problem , 1992, Math. Oper. Res..

[5]  J. Mcmillan.  Selling Spectrum Rights , 1994 .

[6]  Hans Akkermans,et al.  Power Load Management as a Computational Market , 1996 .

[7]  Rune Gustavsson,et al.  HOMEBOTS : Intelligent Decentralized Services for Energy Management , 1996 .

[8]  Dorit S. Hochba,et al.  Approximation Algorithms for NP-Hard Problems , 1997, SIGA.

[9]  Hans Akkermans,et al.  Smart Software as Costumer Assistant in Large-Scale Distributed Load Management , 1997 .

[10]  F. Ygge,et al.  Duality in Multi-Commodity Market Computations , 1997 .

[11]  Arne Andersson,et al.  A Multi-Commodity Market Approach to Power Load Management , 1998 .

[12]  James E. Hanson,et al.  Price-war dynamics in a free-market economy of software agents , 1998 .

[13]  Fredrik Ygge,et al.  Market-Oriented Programming and its Application to Power Load Management , 1998 .

[14]  J. M. Akkermans,et al.  The HomeBots System and Field Test - A Multi-Commodity Market for Predictive Power Load Management, , 1999 .

[15]  David C. Parkes,et al.  iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction , 1999, EC '99.

[16]  Rune Gustavsson,et al.  Agents with power , 1999, CACM.

[17]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches , 1999, IJCAI.

[18]  D. Porter.  The effect of bid withdrawal in a multi-object auction , 1999 .

[19]  Moshe Tennenholtz.  Some Tractable Combinatorial Auctions , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[20]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions , 2000, EC '00.

[21]  A. Tversky,et al.  Choices, Values, and Frames , 2000 .

[22]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  An Algorithm for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[23]  Mark M. Bykowsky,et al.  Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem , 2000 .

[24]  Subhash Suri,et al.  Market Clearability , 2001, IJCAI.

[25]  R. Haas,et al.  Die kalifornische Stromkrise , 2001 .

[26]  Nicholas R. Jennings,et al.  Polynomial algorithms for clearing multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial reverse auctions , 2002, ECAI.

[27]  Ramgopal R. Mettu,et al.  Approximation algorithms for np -hard clustering problems , 2002 .

[28]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions , 2002, Artif. Intell..

[29]  Thomas Sandholm,et al.  Making Markets and Democracy Work: A Story of Incentives and Computing , 2003, IJCAI.

[30]  Nicholas R. Jennings,et al.  Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms , 2003, IEEE Intell. Syst..

[31]  Nicholas R. Jennings,et al.  Optimal clearing algorithms for multi-unit single-item and multi-unit combinatorial auctions with demand/supply function bidding , 2003, ICEC '03.

[32]  Peter Norvig,et al.  Artificial intelligence - a modern approach, 2nd Edition , 2003, Prentice Hall series in artificial intelligence.

[33]  Maria L. Gini,et al.  Scheduling tasks with precedence constraints to solicit desirable bid combinations , 2003, AAMAS '03.

[34]  Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al.  The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction , 2004 .

[35]  Hans Akkermans,et al.  Resource-Oriented Multicommodity Market Algorithms , 2000, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.

[36]  Nicholas R. Jennings,et al.  Resource Allocation in Communication Networks Using Market-Based Agents , 2004, SGAI Conf..

[37]  Michael Stadlera,et al.  INTEGRAL RESOURCE OPTIMIZATION NETWORKS AND THEIR TECHNO-ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS , 2005 .

[38]  Mark Allen Weiss.  Data Structures and Problem Solving Using Java (3rd Edition) , 2005 .

[39]  Nicholas R. Jennings,et al.  An Optimal Distributed Constraint Optimisation Algorithm for Efficient Energy Management , 2005, International Conference on Computational Intelligence for Modelling, Control and Automation and International Conference on Intelligent Agents, Web Technologies and Internet Commerce (CIMCA-IAWTIC'06).

[40]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk — Source link , 2007 .