Interactive Proofs with Provable Security Against Honest Verifiers

Nearly all of the work on constructing zero-knowledge proof systems relies on very strong complexity theoretic assumptions. We consider a form of "no use" zero-knowledge, and show that every language in PSPACE has an interactive proof system that provably achieves "no-use" zero-knowledge against honest verifiers.

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