Node compromise attacks and network connectivity

Net-centric warfare requires widespread, highly reliable communications even in the face of adversarial influences. Maintaining connectivity and secure communications among network entities are vital properties towards mission readiness and execution. In this work, we examine required communications range of nodes in a wireless sensor network. Several parameters of wireless networks are studied in terms of how they influence overall network connectivity such as key predistribution schemes and node compromise attacks. In many battlespace situations for networks of unmanned ground sensor nodes, communication range is limited by resources, hardware ability and unpredictable terrain. Additionally, networks attempt to minimize the transmission power of each node to conserve power, as the radio is oftentimes the largest drain on available energy resources. Furthermore, such networks are vulnerable to physical node compromise and attack by an adversary and destroy connectivity in these situations. What is studied here is overall network connectivity and its relationship to key predistribution schemes and node compromise attacks. In networking situations with an adversarial presence, it may be possible to continue to mission objectives properly with the remaining uncompromised network resources with some reconfiguring of network parameters. We derive a single expression to determine required communication radius for wireless sensor networks to include these situations.

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