Applying a Goal-Oriented Method for Hazard Analysis: A Case Study

Traceability between hazards and countermeasures is important for hazard analysis to give confidence and help justify whether relevant hazards have been considered and sufficiently mitigated. However, use case modeling, the current de facto standard technique for requirements elicitation lacks negative modeling constructs for representing hazards. This paper presents a case study to apply a goal-oriented method for car security related hazard analysis where hazards are represented as operationalizations with negative contribution toward system non-functional requirements (NFRs). In turn, countermeasures are represented as operationalizations with negative contribution toward the respective hazards to negate their negative effect on the NFRs. The study finds that using the goal-oriented approach is most suitable for risk-driven applications, but also compatible and complementary to other applications

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