Logics of imprecise comparative probability

Author(s): Ding, Yifeng; Holliday, Wesley Halcrow; Icard, Thomas Frederick, III | Abstract: This paper studies connections between two alternatives to the standard probability calculus for representing and reasoning about uncertainty: imprecise probability andcomparative probability. The goal is to identify complete logics for reasoning about uncertainty in a comparative probabilistic language whose semantics is given in terms of imprecise probability. Comparative probability operators are interpreted as quantifying over a set of probability measures. Modal and dynamic operators are added for reasoning about epistemic possibility and updating sets of probability measures.

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