Membership Benefits or Selection Effects? Why Former Communist Party Members Do Better in Post-Soviet Russia☆

Abstract The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) served as an important social stratification mechanism. With the collapse of the Soviet state and the transition from state socialism in Russia, the institutional basis for former CPSU members' advantages disappeared. Thus, if former members still enjoy higher earnings than nonmembers, their advantages must stem from their superior human capital, social capital, or the unmeasured attributes that helped them join the Party in the first place. Using the Russian component of the multinational survey, “Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989: General Population Survey,” I model the effects of Party membership on the personal incomes of Russian adults in summer 1993, 1.5 years after the Soviet collapse. OLS regressions indicate that former Party members enjoy an income advantage after the collapse of Communism, net of other variables. Endogenous switching regressions reveal that this advantage stems entirely from selection into the Party on the basis of unobserved variables. Net of the selection effect, there is no residual return to Party membership. The findings imply that institutional change in formerly Communist systems does not fully account for who gets ahead: some individuals can adapt to changed institutional contexts so as to preserve their advantages.

[1]  Yu Xie,et al.  Regional Variation in Earnings Inequality in Reform-Era Urban China , 1996, American Journal of Sociology.

[2]  Victor Nee,et al.  A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism , 1989 .

[3]  R. Mare,et al.  Secondary School Tracking and Educational Inequality: Compensation, Reinforcement, or Neutrality? , 1989, American Journal of Sociology.

[4]  J. Kohlhase,et al.  The Earnings of Soviet Workers: Evidence from the Soviet Interview Project , 1988 .

[5]  V. Nee,et al.  Market Transition and Societal Transformation in Reforming State Socialism , 1996 .

[6]  I. Szelenyi,et al.  The Market Transition Debate: Toward a Synthesis? , 1996, American Journal of Sociology.

[7]  H. Flakierski Income Inequalities in the Former Soviet Union and Its Republics , 1993 .

[8]  David Stark Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism , 1996, American Journal of Sociology.

[9]  Elemér Hankiss East European Alternatives , 1990 .

[10]  B. Harasymiw Political Elite: Recruitment in the Soviet Union , 1984 .

[11]  John R. Logan,et al.  Market transition and the persistence of power: The changing stratification system in urban China , 1996 .

[12]  Szonja Szelényi,et al.  Circulation or reproduction pf elites during the postcommunist transformation of Eastern Europe , 1995 .

[13]  Andrew G. Walder,et al.  Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order , 1995 .

[14]  Robert Legvold,et al.  How Russia became a market economy , 1995 .

[15]  Akos Rona-Tas,et al.  The First Shall Be Last? Entrepreneurship and Communist Cadres in the Transition from Socialism , 1994, American Journal of Sociology.

[16]  S. White,et al.  Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics , 1994 .

[17]  Victor Nee,et al.  Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism: Between Redistribution and Markets in China , 1991 .

[18]  S. White,et al.  From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite , 1996 .

[19]  Andrew G. Walder,et al.  Markets and Inequality in Transitional Economies: Toward Testable Theories , 1996, American Journal of Sociology.

[20]  Ákos Róna-Tas,et al.  Small leap forward: Emergence of new economic elites , 1995 .

[21]  J. Goldthorpe,et al.  The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies , 1993 .

[22]  P. Gregory Politics, work, and daily life in the USSR: Productivity, slack, and time theft in the Soviet economy , 1987 .

[23]  R. J. Hill,et al.  The Soviet Communist Party , 1981 .

[24]  Joseph R. Blasi,et al.  Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy , 1996 .

[25]  Victor Nee,et al.  The Emergence of a Market Society: Changing Mechanisms of Stratification in China , 1996, American Journal of Sociology.

[26]  William L. Parish,et al.  Politics and Markets: Dual Transformations , 1996, American Journal of Sociology.

[27]  Albert Szymaski,et al.  Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union: Six Studies. , 1978 .

[28]  P. Schmidt,et al.  Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. , 1984 .

[29]  D. Treiman,et al.  A standard international socio-economic index of occupational status , 1992 .

[30]  Christopher Winship,et al.  Models for Sample Selection Bias , 1992 .

[31]  E. Hanley,et al.  Russia — old wine in a new bottle? The circulation and reproduction of Russian elites, 1983–1993 , 1995 .

[32]  D. Relles,et al.  Tools for intuition about sample selection bias and its correction , 1997 .

[33]  I. Szelényi,et al.  The making of the Hungarian postcommunist elite: Circulation in politics, reproduction in the economy , 1995 .

[34]  David Stark,et al.  Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe , 1991 .

[35]  M. Hout,et al.  More Shock than Therapy: Market Transition, Employment, and Income in Russia, 1991–19951 , 1998, American Journal of Sociology.

[36]  V. Zaslavsky The Neo-Stalinist State. Class, Ethnicity, and Consensus in Soviet Society. , 1994 .

[37]  T. Rigby,et al.  Political Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev , 1990 .

[38]  J. S. Long,et al.  Endogenous Switching Regression Models for the Causes and Effects of Discrete Variables , 1988 .

[39]  Neil Fligstein,et al.  The Economic Sociology of the Transitions from Socialism , 1996, American Journal of Sociology.