论文信息 - Game theory analysis for carbon auction market through electricity market coupling

Game theory analysis for carbon auction market through electricity market coupling

In this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity production. We set out a clear Nash equilibrium on the power market that can be used to compute equilibrium prices on both markets as well as the related electricity produced and CO2 emissions released.

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