Preference Change and Information Processing

Incoming information not only changes our knowledge but also our preferences. Decisions are made according to the preferences, which are eventually based on our evaluations of the options. In this paper, we will explore the ways new information affects our evaluations to see how this results in a preference change. A qualitative investigation was undertaken in [BL06] in which the preference relation in the initial model is manipulated according to incoming information. Here we will take a more quantitative approach by introducing an evaluation function. Interestingly, in this manner it becomes possible to consider the subtlety of information processing. As an example, suppose that you plan to buy an apartment. There are two candidate apartments d1 and d2 available, located in different places. You have your own judgement based on your current knowledge: they could be equally preferable, or one is more preferable than the other. To mark your evaluation difference, you assign two numbers to d1 and d2, respectively. A newspaper article that “the government is planning to build a park near d1” may increase your value for d1. In contrast, getting to know that the criminal rate is going up in the neighborhood of d1 may decrease your value for d1. The idea is: you start off with the initial values of the options, and keep scoring in accordance with the new information, either adding points if the information has a positive influence on the option, or dropping points in case it has a negative effect, the number zero is added when it does not have any effect or is irrelevant. Altogether this brings about an evaluation change from which the preference change can be induced.

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