A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution

A strategy revision process in symmetric normal form games is proposed. Following Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), members of a population periodically revise their strategy choice, and choose a myopic best response to currently observed play. Their payoffs are perturbed by normally distributed Harsanyian (1973) trembles, so that strategies are chosen according to multinomial probit probabilities. As the variance of payoffs is allowed to vanish, the graph theoretic methods of the earlier literature continue to apply. The distributional assumption enables a convenient closed form characterisation for the weights of the rooted trees. An illustration of the approach is offered, via a consideration of the role of dominated strategies in equilibrium selection.

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