NATO NEC C2 Maturity Model

Abstract : Two key realities dominate thinking about command and control (C2) in the 21st century. The first is the nature of the 21st century military mission space. This space is characterised by its extreme uncertainty. In addition to the high intensity combat operations that are traditionally associated with military operations, the 21st century mission space has expanded to include a wide spectrum of mission challenges, ranging from providing support to multi-agency disaster relief operations to complex coalition efforts within a political-military environment involving a large variety of military and non-military actors; which we describe as Complex Endeavours. The second reality is the ongoing transformation of 21st century militaries, and for that matter, other 21st century institutions and actors from the Industrial Age to the Information Age. With this transformation comes the ability to leverage new information technologies. This has had, and will continue to have, a profound effect on how institutions manage themselves and how they can work with coalition partners. These fundamental realities put the emphasis on command and control (C2), interpreted in its broadest sense to include acquiring, managing, sharing and exploiting information, and supporting individual and collective decision-making. In particular, more mature C2 includes the ability to recognise situational change, and to adopt the C2 approach required to meet that change which we term C2 Agility. The NATO NEC C2 Maturity Model (N2C2M2) we have developed builds on dearly won insights from the past, but goes beyond them in order that we can exploit Information Age approaches to address these new mission challenges. This way of thinking about C2 is thus entirely compatible with current NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) thinking on Future Capable Forces which puts the emphasis on Mission Command within federated complex environments and ad hoc coalitions.

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